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Abstract. This paper proposes a system of agents that make predic-
tions over the presence of intrusions. Some of the agents act as predic-
tors implementing a given Intrusion Detection model, sniffing out the
same traffic. An assessment agent weights the forecasts of such predictor
agents, giving a final binary conclusion using a probabilistic model. These
weights are continuously adapted according to the previous performance
of each predictor agent. Other agent establishes if the prediction from
the assessor agent was right or not, sending him back the results. This
process is continually repeated and runs without human interaction. The
effectiveness of our proposal is measured with the usual method applied
in Intrusion Detection domain: Receiver Operating Characteristic curves
(detection rate versus false alarm rate). Results of the adaptive agents
applied to intrusion detection improve ROC curves as it is shown in this
paper.
1 Introduction
Research on intrusion detection topic is very active. Several models have been
proposed and they are still evolving. There are also problems with the automa-
tion of such intrusion detection models. In fact, nowadays these models are used
in close combination with a human supervisor (so called Site Security Officer)
[14].
One of the main questions about intrusion detection models or systems (in
advance, IDS) is to know how effective they are at detecting intrusions while
raising as fewer false alarms as possible. In order to evaluate the effectiveness
[15] of IDS the use of Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) has been largely
proposed [16],[17],[15],[18]. ROC curves plot detection rate versus false alarm
rate. A ROC curve shows the false alarm rate incurred by choosing a particular
detection rate. Some IDS can be tuned to accept a higher false alarm rate in order
to detect more attacks. IDS based on signature detection, however, produce a
binary output of 1 for a declared attack and 0 for a normal session. That is why
they are represented by a single point on the ROC curve [17] (sometimes a line
joining this point to (0,0) and another line joining it to (1,1) is plotted). ROC
technique has also been used in other fields where detection rates are object
of study such as signal detection, speaker identification, medical risk prediction
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and meteorology [19][20][21][22][23]. The bigger the area under the ROC curve
is (AROC) the bigger the IDS effectiveness is [17].
In this scope agents may play an important role: agents intend a complete
automation of complex processes acting in behalf of human users [11]. Several
definitions and approaches to agent term have led to some confusion. From the
Artificial Intelligence point of view, agents are classified as reactive or delibera-
tive according to the external or internal nature of the intelligent behavior. In
this way, deliberative agents often accomplish the so called BDI paradigm [12]
where knowledge is structured in three different levels of abstraction: beliefs,
intentions and desires.
Intelligent agents presumably can adapt decision making through the cooper-
ation with other agents [10]. Communication between agents is usually modeled
through human-like typed messages including performatives inspired in Speech
Act Theory (for instance, KQML [13]).
Particularly, agents have been applied to this dominion in the past [2]. For
instance, a methodology [3], an architecture [1] were proposed, and also some IDS
were implemented as agent systems using genetic algorithms [5], and neurofuzzy
controllers [4].
2 The Analysis of Relative Operating Characteristic
In order to asses the skill of a probabilistic prediction (based on several IDS
agents) we use the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) in a slightly dif-
ferent way [23]. In our case study, ROC measures the success and false alarm
rates of an ensemble; made by assuming an event E will occur if it is predicted
with a probability exceeding some specified probability threshold pt. The differ-
ence with usual ROC approximation in intrusion detection is that the threshold
we vary is not the false alarm threshold, but the probability of occurrence the
”event”. Indirectly, this is like tuning the false alarm threshold of the probabilis-
tic system.
This definition is based on the notion that a prediction of an event E is
assumed if E is predicted by at least a fraction p = pt of ensemble members,
where the threshold pt is defined a priori.
Let us consider first a deterministic (single model) prediction of E (either
that it will occur or that it will not occur). Over a sufficiently large sample of in-
dependent predictions, we can form the prediction contingency matrix (Table 1)
giving the frequency that E occurred or not, and whether it was predicted or
not.
Based on these values, the hit rate(H) and false alarm rate (F ) for a deter-
ministic prediction are given by
H = δ/(β + δ).
F = γ/(α+ γ).
(1)
Hit and false alarm rates for a probabilistic prediction can be redefined as
follows [24]. Suppose it is assumed that E will happen if the probability of the
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Table 1. Prediction contingency matrix
Ocurrs
No Yes
Prediction No α β
Yes γ δ
prediction p is greater than pt (and will not if p < pt ). By varying pt between
0 and 1 we can define H = H(pt), F = F (pt).
The ROC curve is a plot of H(pt) against F (pt). A measure of skill is given
by the area under the ROC curve (AROC). A perfect deterministic forecast will
have AROC = 1, while a no skill-forecast for which the hit and false alarm rates
are equal, will have AROC = 0.5.
In our case study the event E is ”an intrusion”. We will have different models
(different IDS) that try to detect intrusions. These models must deal with the
same traffic and must not take any action on it.
3 The role of Agents
The proposed system has three different types of agents: predictor, assessor and
manager. In the scenario considered, there are several predictor agents and only
one assessor agent and one manager agent. But it would make sense to use several
assessor agents rather than just one, since not every predictor would be asked
by each assessor agent, and they would also adopt different weighting criteria.
The main role of a predictor agent consists of suggesting if there is an in-
trusion or not when an assessor agent asks him for a prediction. On the other
hand, major goal of assessor agents is giving proper weights to predictor agents
according to the previous level of success, and afterwards, making a binary de-
cision based on such weighted references. Finally the manager agent calculates
H and F and, at last, it communicates the results to the assessor agent. The
manager agent knows if there was an intrusion or not because the experiment is
done under a training environment. The interactions between agents are typed
as KQML messages. You can see an illustrative example of such interactions in
figure Fig. 1.
All of this agents adopt a BDI-like architecture, where abstract desires be-
came in concrete goals when external perceptions would be sensed. Each of these
goals has an associated generic plan composed of a sequence of atomic intentions.
The intelligence of agents relies on how predictions are weighted according to
the success of previous predictions in order to make a suggestion. Nevertheless
plans of predictor and manager agents show a straightforward behavior rather
than the adaptive reasoning of assessor agents.
Our proposal in this publication involves the use of the ratio H-F as a weight
in the aggregated sum of predictor agents. Therefore, the reputation of certain
predictor agent would increase if the number of hit rates became higher, and
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Fig. 1. Interactions between agents
if the number of false alarm rates remains in a low level. After updating these
weights with the last results, all of them are normalized, and the corresponding
equations result:
Weighti =
(Hi − Fi + 1)÷ 2∑
j(Hj − Fj + 1)÷ 2
(2)
Suggestion =
∑
i
Weighti × Predictioni (3)
4 Simulated Results
The main goal of this section is to explain how our model of agents works and
to show the benefits of dynamic adaptation of agents to improve the decision
making. The level of success of this adaptive behavior is compared with agents
evaluating all the predictions with the same behavior (weight= 1 / number of
predictors). No real data of traffic was able to be used in the experiments, but
a possible simulation of such data were tested.
Let us analyze the experimental setup: Many predictor agents (IDS models),
eight in our example, are considered. The events to predict are the same event
E for all of them, and it consists of an intrusion. A possible scenario is the one
in Table 2.
An assessor agent suggests if there has been an intrusion or not depending
on how many models has predicted the event (Prob. of table 2) vs. a weighted
sum. This suggestion is made through the comparison with a certain threshold
pt.
Five different thresholds uniformly distributed were considered in both ex-
periments (0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1.0). In this way, comparing the average sum and
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Table 2. Possible measures on the event E (intrusion). 1 represents the predictor
agent (IDS model) has launched an alert on the event E (predicts that E happens).
0 represents it does not. If the event E is finally verified by the manager agent, it is
represented by 1. If it does not it is represented by a 0
Day 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
IDS1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0
IDS2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
IDS3 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0
IDS4 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
IDS5 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0
IDS6 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
IDS7 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1
IDS8 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Prob 0.125 0.25 0.25 0.625 0.125 0.5 0.25 0.5 0.375 0.375 0.125 0.625 0.625 0.375 0.125
Occurs 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0
Day 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
IDS1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0
IDS2 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
IDS3 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0
IDS4 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
IDS5 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
IDS6 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
IDS7 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1
IDS8 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
Prob 0.875 0.25 0.25 0.625 0.125 0.875 0.25 0.875 0.375 0.375 0.125 0.625 0.875 0.375 0.125
Occurs 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0
threshold pt = 0.2 for instance, we can observe the suggestions made in table 3.
Table 3. Ten days measures on the event E. Prediction (based on a threshold pt = 0.2)
and what really happened is binary represented
Day 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
pt = 0.2 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0
Occurs 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0
Day 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
pt = 0.2 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0
Occurs 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0
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With the lowest and the highest thresholds the hit rate (H), and the false
alarm rate (F) values are the same in both experiments:
– For pt = 0.0 : H = 1.000 F = 1.000
– For pt = 0.2 : H = 0.909 F = 0.684
– For pt = 0.8 : H = 0.273 F = 0.053
– For pt = 1.0 : H = 0.000 F = 0.000
The suggestions from the assessor agent for pt = 0.6 are:
– With a constant evaluation of predictor agents (average sum):
H = 0.545 F = 0.158
– With an adaptive evaluation of predictor agents (dynamic weights):
H = 0.545 F = 0.107
From these data we observe a similar number of hit rates and a slightly lower
number of false alarms with an adaptive evaluation.
At last, the suggestions from the assessor agent for pt = 0.4 are:
– With a constant evaluation of predictor agents (average sum):
H = 0.545 F = 0.263
– With an adaptive evaluation of predictor agents (dynamic weights):
H = 0.909 F = 0.421
From these data, we can observe more hit rates in the adaptive evaluation than
in the constant evaluation, but it also appears to be more false alarms. So at first
glance it does not show clearly which alternative is better. But Fig. 2 representing
the AROC curves of both possible evaluations shows that an adaptive evaluation
of agents include a greater area than the constant evaluation.
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Fig. 2. AROC of adaptive agent approach vs. average one. Area corresponding to adap-
tive agent model is bigger, showing a better effectiveness of the model
Mathematically, the area of both alternatives is:
– With a constant evaluation of predictor agents (average sum): 0.75
– With an adaptive evaluation of predictor agents (dynamic weights): 0.81
So an improvement of 7.25% is achieved with the adaptive behaviour of agents
proposed in this paper.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we have proposed a system of different types of agents cooper-
ating in order to detect intrusions. One of these types implements IDS models,
other evaluates the predictions from them, and finally a third kind of agent con-
siders the suggestions and emulates the results with which future evaluations
will be more accurate. The dynamic weights involved in the adaptive evaluation
performed to generate a final suggestion from several different Intrusion Detec-
tion models showed a better performance than classical approach based on the
average sum of the predictions received.
Furthermore, the multiagent system applied to this dominion, allow us dif-
ferent future directions of research. For instance, the use of a fuzzy threshold
applied over the average sum of predictions causes a relevant improvement in the
overall performance of Intrusion Detection task [6]. Such fuzzy threshold may
be used also as adapted dynamically in order to obtain even better results.
In the future, we intend to use the architecture of agents proposed to compute
and represent the reputation of predictor agents as a fuzzy set in the same way
that AFRAS [9]. In order to do such fuzzy evaluation we will use an analysis of
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the economical costs involved in the precautionary action taken by the manager
agent. This reputation mechanism showed a fast convergence, while sensitivity to
sudden changes avoids a high level of deception [8]. Finally, it could be interesting
to try with real data, and also to test several assessor agents analyzing different
traffic data.
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